Recently, Chien et al. proposed an efficient timestampbased remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. The main merits include: (1) user-independent server, i.e., there is no password or verification table kept in the server; (2) users can freely choose their passwords; (3) mutual authentication is provided between the user and the server; and (4) lower communication and computation cost. In this paper, we show that Chien et al.'s scheme is insecure against forgery attack because one adversary can easily pretend to be a legal user, pass the server's verification and login to the remote system successfully. An improved scheme is proposed that can overcome the security risk while still preserving all the above advantages.
Introduction
In a distributed computer network, remote users can request server's services by effective user authentication schemes. As a protection mechanism of user authentication, the following criteria are crucial. C1 User-independent server: No password or verification table is required to be kept in a server. C2 Freely choose password: Whether the users can choose their passwords freely or not. C3 Mutual authentication: Whether the users and the server can authenticate each other or not. C4 Lower communication and computation cost: The smart cards usually do not support powerful computation capability and abundant bandwidth. Remote password authentication scheme, proposed by Lamport [1] in 1981, is a method to authenticate remote users over an insecure channel. Since then, several schemes [2] - [17] have been proposed to address this problem partly or completely. Recently, Chien et al. [18] also proposed another efficient scheme, which satisfied all the criteria. In this paper, we show that Chien et al.'s scheme is insecure against forgery because one adversary can easily pretend to be a legal user, pass the server's verification and login to the remote system successfully. An improved scheme is proposed that can overcome the security risk while still preserving all the above advantages.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 show that Chien et al.'s scheme is insecure against forgery attack. In Sect. 4, an improved scheme is proposed to overcome this attack. Finally, we conclude this paper in Sect. 5.
Chien et al.'s Scheme
In [18] , Chien et al. proposed a timestamp-based remote user authentication scheme. This scheme can satisfy all the criteria. We review this scheme in the following.
• Registration phase: Let x be the secret key, which is the only secret maintained by the server, and h() be a secure one-way hash function with fixed-length output. Assume User U i submits his identity ID i and his password PW i to the server for registration. The server computes
and issues the smart card which stores h() and R i to the user. • Login phase:
When a user U i wants to login to the server, he attaches his smart card into a card reader. Then, he keys in his identity ID i and password pw i to the device. Then the following operations are performed by the smart card:
where T is the current time used as a timestamp. 3. Send the message (ID i , T, C 2 ) to the server.
• Verification phase:
After receiving the authentication request message (ID i , T, C 2 ), the server and the smart card execute the following jobs to facilitate the mutual authentication between the user U i and the server. 1. The server checks the validity of ID i , and verifies the time interval between T and T to resist the replay attack, where T is the timestamp when the request message is received. 2. The server computes C 1 = h(ID i ⊕ x), and verifies whether C 2 ? = h(C 1 ⊕ T ). If the verification fails, then the server rejects the request; otherwise, the server accepts U i 's request and goes to Step 3. 3. The server acquires the current time stamp T , and computes C 3 = h(C 1 ⊕ T ). The server sends back the message (T , C 3 ). 4. Upon receiving the message (T , C 3 ), U i verifies the validity of the timestamp T . Then U i verifies whether C 3 ? = h(C 1 ⊕T ). If so, U i believes that the responding part is the real server, and the mutual authentication is done; otherwise, U i disconnects the connection.
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Forgery Attacks on Chien et al.'s Scheme
In this section, we show that Chien et al.'s scheme is insecure against forgery attack because any adversary can pretend to be a legal user U i and login the remote system successfully. It is clear that if the adversary can forge a valid M = (ID i , T, C 2 ) passing the checking equations, then he can login the remote system successfully. In the following, we show how an adversary can forge a pair (ID i , T, C 2 ) such that it passes the verification equations. A legal user U i wants to login to the server, U i sends the message (ID i , T, C 2 ) to the server. Because U i is a legal user, the message (ID i , T, C 2 ) can pass the server's verification. The server then responses the message (T , C 3 ) to the user, where T is the current time the server responses the message and C 3 = h(C 1 ⊕ T ). Now, the adversary U a intercepts the message (T , C 3 ), masquerade as the legal user U i and then create a new session. He sends the login mes-
will pass the server's verification due to the format of C 2 is the same as C 3 . Then, the server sends back the message (T , C 3 ) to U a . The adversary U a successfully forges the legal user U i to login the remote server.
Improvement of Chien et al.'s Scheme
The main keypoint which the forgery attack can work is that the format of the login request message C 2 is the same as the verification message C 3 . Therefore, an adversary intercepted the verification message (T , C 3 ), he can create another session using M = (ID i , T , C 2 ) and passing the checking equations, where C 2 = C 3 . To overcome the security risk, we include a hash function and change the format of C 3 . We omit the registration phase and login phase due to they are the same as Chein et al.'s scheme and show it in the following.
• Verification phase: After receiving the authentication request message (ID i , T, C 2 ), the server and the smart card execute the following jobs to facilitate the mutual authentication between the user U i and the server. 1. The server checks the validity of ID i , and verifies the time interval between T and T to resist the replay attack, where T is the timestamp when the request message is received. 2. The server computes C 1 = h(ID i ⊕ x), and verifies whether C 2 ? = h(C 1 ⊕ T ). If the verification fails, then the server rejects the request; otherwise, the server accepts U i 's request and goes to Step 3. 3. The server acquires the current time stamp T , and computes C 3 = h(C 1 ⊕ h(T )). The server sends back the message (T , C 3 ). 4. Upon receiving the message (T , C 3 ), U i verifies the validity of the timestamp T . Then U i verifies whether C 3 ? = h(C 1 ⊕ h(T )). If so, U i believes that the responding part is the real server, and the mutual authentication is done; otherwise, U i disconnects the connection.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown that Chien et al.'s scheme is insecure against forgery attack because one adversary can easily pretend to be a legal user and pass the server's verification to login to the remote system successfully. An improved scheme has proposed that can overcome the security risk while still preserving all the above advantages.
